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Abstract
It is widely assumed that there is a natural, prelinguistic conceptual domain of 
time whose linguistic organization is universally structured via metaphoric 
mapping from the lexicon and grammar of space and motion. We challenge this 
assumption on the basis of our research on the Amondawa (Tupi Kawahib) 
language and culture of Amazonia. Using both observational data and struc-
tured field linguistic tasks, we show that linguistic space-time mapping at the 
constructional level is not a feature of the Amondawa language, and is not 
employed by Amondawa speakers (when speaking Amondawa). Amondawa 
does not recruit its extensive inventory of terms and constructions for spatial 
motion and location to express temporal relations. Amondawa also lacks a 
numerically based calendric system. To account for these data, and in opposi-
tion to a Universal Space-Time Mapping Hypothesis, we propose a Mediated 
Mapping Hypothesis, which accords causal importance to the numerical and 
artefact-based construction of time-based (as opposed to event-based) time 
interval systems.
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1.	 Introduction
Our purpose in this paper is twofold. First, we challenge the widespread as-
sumption of the universality of linguistic mappings between space and time. In 
linguistic space-to-time mapping, words and constructions whose etymologi-
cally primary (and, putatively, more psychologically basic) meanings concep-
tualize location and motion in space are recruited to express temporal rela-
tional notions. Lexical space-time mapping is widespread (Haspelmath 1997; 
Grady 1999), and constructional mapping (which is the focus of this article) 
has been analysed in languages as typologically and geographically disparate 
as (amongst others) English (Clark 1973; Lakoff and Johnson 1999), Aymara 
( Núñez and Sweetser 2006), Chinese (Yu 1998) and Wolof (Moore 2006). 
However, we are not aware of any previous studies investigating linguistic 
space-time mapping at the constructional level in the languages of small-scale 
human groups whose traditional way of life is dominated by hunting, fishing, 
gathering and small-scale cultivation.
The analysis of linguistic space-time mapping in terms of Conceptual Meta-
phor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), based upon claimed universal human cogni-
tive processes, has led to the widespread assumption that such linguistic map-
pings are universal. Fauconnier and Turner (2008: 55), for example, claim that 
“Time as Space is a deep metaphor for all human beings. It is common across 
cultures, psychologically real, productive and profoundly entrenched in thought 
and language.” We challenge this Universal Mapping Hypothesis on the basis 
of our research on the Western Amazonian Tupi Kawahib language Amondawa. 
Note, importantly, that we do not thereby challenge the hypothesized univer-
sality of the cognitive foundations of linguistic space-time mapping; indeed, 
we shall present some evidence in support of such cognitive universalism.
If our challenge to the universality of linguistic space-time mappings is well 
founded, we need to account in a principled way both for the ubiquity of such 
mappings and for their absence in some languages. This is the second purpose 
of this paper. The account that we propose accords a central role to the cultural 
and cognitive construction of time-based time interval systems. Such time in-
terval systems permit the framing of inter-event relationships as dynamic or 
static relations occurring within a schematic time frame that is conceptually 
autonomous from the events thus framed. We concur, therefore, with Moore 
(2006: 232) that “motion metaphors of time need to be analyzed as mappings 
across frames.” We further propose, however, that such frame-to-frame space-
time mappings, while being cognitively and experientially motivated, are only 
actuated given certain cultural-historical conditions involving the making and 
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use of symbolic cognitive artefacts permitting the measurement of time inter-
vals. This segmentation and measurement is what underlies social practices of 
time reckoning, practices that have been widely studied by anthropologists. In 
turn, time reckoning is dependent upon (a) the cultural construction of count-
ing practices based upon large number systems (Pica et al. 2004); and ( possi-
bly) ( b) the cultural-cognitive schema of a linear number line (Dehaene et al. 
2008). Our account therefore proposes that analogical, frame-to-frame space-
time mappings are the emergent product of the intercalation of numeric sym-
bolic cognitive processes with language, supported by historically developed 
cognitive artefacts such as calendars and clocks. It is this hypothesis that we 
shall designate the Mediated Mapping Hypothesis.
2.	 Space-time	mappings	and	temporal	relations
Locative and motion words belonging to different form classes can be used in 
a variety of constructions to express temporal relations. For example, English 
employs expressions such as:
(1) The weekend is coming.
(2) The summer has passed.
(3) He is coming up to retirement.
(4) Check-in was well ahead of departure.
(5) He worked through the night.
(6) She will be promoted in the coming year.
(7) The party is on Friday.
(8) His birthday is this side of Christmas.
(9) I am going to get up early tomorrow.
Expressions such as (1) and (2) have been characterised (Clark 1973) as em-
ploying a MOVING TIME metaphor, in contradistinction to (3) which exem-
plifies a MOVING EGO metaphor. As Moore (2006: 200) puts it, “in both 
cases, ego plays a central role in the metaphorical motion event, and both met-
aphors construe temporal experience from ego’s perspective.” Moore then 
goes on to distinguish such constructions from expressions such as (4), which 
is not ego-relative, and which exemplifies what he calls a SEQUENCE AS 
POSITION ON A PATH metaphor. For simplicity, we shall classify expres-
sions involving either MOVING TIME or MOVING EGO metaphors as Ego-
relative temporal motion constructions, and expressions such as (4) as Posi-
tional time constructions.1 Example (5) shows that non-motion verbs may be 
1.  What we designate as Positional Time constructions are organized by the field-based tem-
poral frame of reference (Moore 2011); arguably corresponding to McTaggart’s “B-series” 
(McTaggart 1908; see also Zinken 2010).
140 C. Sinha et al.
inserted into Ego-relative temporal motion construction frames (in this case, 
expressing a MOVING ACTIVITY construed from the perspective of ego). 
Adjectival expressions such as (6) are derivative from the MOVING TIME 
metaphor. Stative expressions such as (7) and (8) can be thought of as variants 
of Positional time, referenced to a linear or cyclic time interval schema such as 
days of the week or months of the year. Going to-expressions such as (9) occur 
in many languages and have been extensively analysed in the g rammaticalization 
literature as involving semantic extension from intention to go to a location, to 
intention to act (Pérez 1990; Bybee et al. 1994; Poplack and Tagliamonte 2000).
Here, we shall mainly be concerned with Ego-relative temporal motion con-
structions and Positional time constructions. Ego-relative motion construc-
tions are by definition metaphorical in some sense, in that they employ spatial 
lexemes. Positional time constructions, on the other hand, may employ l exemes 
that have (non-archaically) only temporal meanings, as in:
(10) After dinner they went for a walk.
(11) Check in was well before departure.
(12) January is before February.
Positional time constructions in many languages permit speakers to invert ac-
tual event order in order of mention:
(13) Before dinner they went for a walk.
Thus, both Ego-relative temporal motion and Positional time construction frames 
permit flexible construal (Langacker 1987) on the basis of shifting perspective 
and topicalization. They offer this flexibility because they have in common that 
events are conceptually ordered on a notional linear or cyclical time-line (of 
past to/from future) that permits perspectivization from a point non-coincident 
with the deictic “now” of utterance. It is only on the basis of such schematiza-
tion, we contend, that frame-to-frame space-time mapping can occur.
In our Western cultural and cognitive world, we are accustomed to the no-
tion that ‘Time’ is an autonomous, abstract conceptual domain. We are not re-
ferring here to the phenomenal experience of time as duration, or as a funda-
mental aspect of events (Bergson 1910), but about the way in which time is 
thought about and talked about. Our usual cultural presupposition is that time, 
in this latter sense, constitutes a domain of thought-about, reflective experi-
ence, schematized in linear or cyclic terms, that is in some sense independent 
of the events that occur “in time”. This abstract conceptual domain we shall 
refer to as Time as Such.2
2.  There is no consensually recognised terminology for referring to what we here call Time as 
Such. Peter Harder ( pc) has suggested the term “Platonic Time”, but this has connotations of 
a Form independent of human practice, while we emphasise that the abstract notion of Time 
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Contrary to the assumptions of many cognitive scientists, we maintain that 
there is no natural, prelinguistic and preconceptual schema of Time that, as it 
were, passively invites and receives ( by way of image-schematic structural 
correspondence) mappings from spatial relational concepts, words and con-
structions. Rather, it is the constructed temporal schemas of linearity and cy-
clicity that permit the conceptualization of temporal relationships as existing in 
a domain of content that is abstracted from the events themselves. It is this (in 
some sense imaginary) content that we designate ‘Time as Such’. A guiding 
assumption of much current research in language and cognitive sciences 
(which can be traced back at least to the philosophical reflections of Immanuel 
Kant (1929 [1787]), is that ‘Time as Such’ is a universal cognitive category. An 
important exception to this generalization is to be found in Evans (2004), who 
proposes that what he calls the “matrix” sense of time (see Note 2) is not uni-
versal, and that “Moving Time and Moving Ego are culturally constructed 
complex cognitive models” (Evans 2004: 212), a hypothesis that we flesh out 
in this article.
3.	 Time-based	time	intervals	and	symbolic	cognitive	artefacts
Time-based time intervals are those whose boundaries are constituted by the 
segmentation of the conceptual domain of ‘Time as Such’. Examples are hours 
and weeks. They can be distinguished from event-based time intervals, whose 
boundaries are constituted by the events themselves, such as sunrise. The exis-
tence of time-based time interval systems enables the framing of events in 
‘Time as Such’, which in turn, we propose, permits the space-time frame map-
pings underlying Ego-relative temporal motion and Positional time linguistic 
construction frames. We suggest that a cultural-historical precondition for 
schematization of time-based time interval systems is the material anchoring 
(Hutchins 2005; Fauconnier and Turner 2008) of quantified time intervals in 
cognitive artefacts for measuring, segmenting and reckoning time, such as cal-
endar notations and clocks.
All human artefacts are in a broad sense cognitive, inasmuch as they e mbody 
human intentionality (Sinha 1988; Bloom 1996). However, there is a special 
subclass of what we here call symbolic cognitive artefacts, that can be defined 
as comprising those artefacts — which may either be entirely symbolic, or may 
as Such is specifically a consequence of cultural and cognitive practices of its measurement, 
and that its abstraction from such practices depends upon its symbolic organization and mate-
rial anchoring. Kevin Moore ( pc) has suggested that it is equivalent to Evans’s (2004: 141) 
“matrix sense” of time. We agree with this, but emphasize that Time as Such is a concept that 
covers not only the nominalized abstraction but also its schematic framing; indeed we suggest 
below that the former is derived from the latter.
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embed or “anchor” symbolic information in material structures (Hutchins 
2005) — that support symbolic and conceptual processes in abstract conceptual 
domains. Examples of symbolic cognitive artefacts are notational systems (in-
cluding writing and number), dials, calendars and compasses.
Cultural and cognitive schemas organizing ‘Time as Such’ may be consid-
ered as dependent upon, and not merely expressed by, the employment of sym-
bolic cognitive artefacts. Examples (7) and (12) above depend upon the inter-
subjective agreement of speaker and hearer to base shared reference upon the 
conceptual schemas of days of the week and months of the year, which them-
selves are dependent upon a language-based notational system (the symbolic 
cognitive artefact). A key property of symbolic cognitive artefacts is thus that 
they are conventional. Symbolic cognitive artefacts may be motivated by nat-
ural facts, and the human phenomenological experience of these facts, (e.g. the 
orbit of sun or moon, the number of fingers on a human hand), but they are not 
determined by them (witness, for example, the variety of arithmetical bases for 
number systems).
Symbolic cognitive artefacts are special instances of the extended embodi-
ment of cognition (Sinha and Jensen de López 2000). The symbolic systems 
and conceptual schemas that they support permit the socio-cognitive practices 
(and the reproduction of these practices through inter-generational transmis-
sion) constituting a segment of the life world of individual and group (Schutz 
1966). The invention and use of symbolic cognitive artefacts is a crucial (and 
species-specific) aspect of the “ratchet effect” (Tomasello 1999) in human cul-
tural evolution and development. In following sections we shall show, with 
reference to the Amondawa language and culture, that there is at least one cul-
ture that lacks a social and linguistic concept of ‘Time as Such’, that lexicalizes 
no time-based time intervals (as defined above), and that does not employ the 
lexicon or grammar of space to express temporal relations. Our hypothesis is 
that this constellation of facts is not accidental, but attests to the role of sym-
bolic cognitive artefacts in making possible certain kinds of linguistic and con-
ceptual structures.
4.	 Calendars	and	time	reckoning:	anthropological	perspectives
There is a considerable body of research dealing with culturally specific calen-
dric systems.3 Calendric systems frequently possess a recursive structure such 
that different time intervals are embedded within each other, and/or a structure 
of metrically overlapping intervals. These intervals are typically cyclical in 
3.  We restrict this discussion to time interval systems, rather than attempting to address the much 
wider topic of the anthropology of time in general. For reviews, see Gell (1992), Munn (1992).
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nature, with both embedded and overlapping cycles. The most familiar to us is 
the now widely adopted lunar and solar (more strictly, monthly and annual) 
Gregorian calendar. A dramatic example of the complexity that such systems 
can attain is provided by the classical Mayan calendars.
The Mayan civilization used three different calendar systems. The so-called 
Long Count calendar organized the historical time of the classic period of 
M ayan in a fashion comparable to a car’s odometer, counting days in geared 
cycles of ascending size. The Long Count used the number 360 as an approxi-
mation of the year, multiplying the 20-day months by eighteen to arrive at a 
round-figure year of 360 days. This was called a tun. Twenty tuns composed a 
katun, and twenty katuns formed one baktun. These time intervals (tun, katun 
and baktun) could be used to specify any day in Maya history. The Long Count 
could also generate time references in an (in principle) infinite scale, a fact 
which both structured Mayan cosmology and was the main motivation and 
function for Mayan mathematical knowledge; this worked with place value 
and the number zero, both unknown to Mediterranean classical antiquity. The 
Tzolkin (counting days or Sacred Year) calendar was a ceremonial calendar, 
with 20 periods of 13 days, thus completing a ritual cycle every 260 days. The 
Haab was a civil calendar based on a year of 360 days consisting of 18 periods 
of 20 days. Five days were added at the end of the Haab year to approximately 
synchronize it with the solar year (Edmonson 1976; Wright 1991).
Calendric systems are not purely quantitative systems of measurement and 
ordination. They are also expressive of cultural beliefs and values. The W estern 
(Gregorian) calendric system, for example, conceptually superimposes on its 
cyclic structure a linear model of time as involving motion from an origin (the 
birth of Christ) to a notional endpoint (the End of Days). This dualistic c yclical-
linear conceptualization (with varying relations of dominance between cyclic-
ity and linearity) is characteristic also of other calendric systems, such as the 
Mayan (described above), the Islamic and the Vedic (Keyes 1975).
Geertz (1973), in his classic paper ‘Person, time and conduct in Bali’, ar-
gued that temporality (and time interval measurement) in Balinese culture can-
not be comprehended without recognizing its contextual embedding within 
Balinese notions of personhood, social status and social role. Personhood, so-
cial role and time form a complex matrix in which Geertz (as interpreted by 
Vickers 1990: 166) argues, “time in Bali is not linear, that is not quantitatively 
divided, but qualitative — organized in terms of degrees of malevolence and 
benevolence.” Calendric time is thus co-constituted with social norms of con-
duct and power (Bloch 1977). It is this interpretation that underlies Geertz’s 
hypothesis that Balinese time is ‘de-temporalized’ — the Balinese, claims 
Geertz (1973: 398), have “a classificatory, full-and-empty, ‘de-temporalized’ 
conception of time in contexts where the fact that natural conditions vary peri-
odically has to be at least minimally acknowledged”.
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Gell (1992: 72) points out, however, that “the evidence for Balinese detem-
poralization is specifically connected with the permutational calendar . . . that 
it does not generate regular periodicities (such as solar years subdivide into 
lunar months, which subdivide into market weeks, etc). Instead the permuta-
tional calendar specifies quantum units (days) in terms of the combined p roduct 
of independent five-, six- and seven-day cycles.” Alongside this Pawukon per-
mutational calendar, which commutes a complex trinomial expression whose 
completion takes 210 days, the Balinese also employ a variant of the luni-solar 
Hindu (Vedic) calendar. Gell (1992: 73) summarizes Geertz’s argument as 
b eing that “both Balinese calendars are non-metrical and ‘non-durational’, and 
thus correspond to the climaxless ‘steady state’ and non-progressive tenor of 
Balinese life.”
Geertz’s analysis has been criticized on various grounds, ranging from its 
Durkheimian over-emphasis on ritualistic conduct (Bloch 1977) to its neglect 
of the significance in everyday time reckoning of the quantitative computa-
tions made possible by the Balinese calendar, and the degree of expertise dis-
played by the Balinese in exploiting these possibilities. Without entering too 
deeply into this issue, we would make a very simple point: whatever cogni-
tive and social significance we may wish to accord to cultural variations in 
calendric systems (see also Keyes 1975; Davis 1976 on the Northern Thai 
system), all such systems are quantificational, in the sense of being based 
upon a measurement system, and all can be considered as time-based, seg-
menting and measuring temporal duration in ‘Time as Such’. The speech prac-
tices of reckoning or telling time, with their etymological roots in Germanic 
words for counting (e.g. Dutch rekenen, ‘to count’) express and reproduce this 
quantificational view of time. Analagous arguments to those applying to calen-
dric time can be made for ‘clock time’, that is the conceptualization and mea-
surement of time intervals in the diurnal cycle, although less attention has been 
paid to this in the anthropological and linguistic literature (see however Postill 
2002).
Not all societies employ either calendar or clock systems of the quantifica-
tional type. Evans-Pritchard (1939, 1940) described what he termed the Nuer 
“cattle clock” or “occupational time”. Time in Nuer society, he proposed, is 
based on environmental changes and associated social activities. The concept 
of time in Nuer society is thus a product of the interplay between “ecological 
time” and “social structure time.”
The oecological [sic] cycle is a year. Its distinctive rhythm is the backwards and for-
wards movement from villages to camps, which is the Nuer’s response to the climatic 
dichotomy of rains and drought . . . [while] social structure time is a relation between a 
man and the social activities which relate men structurally to one and another (Evans-
Pritchard 1939: 189–192).
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The Nuer ruon (year) divides time into two principal seasons, tot (rainy sea-
son) and mei (dry season). These two main seasons are supplemented by clas-
sifications based on activities. For example, Jiom “windy” refers to the period 
when the cattle-camps are formed, and Rwil refers to the period of moving 
from camp to village, clearing cultivations and planting (ibid.: 192). Although 
there are names for (roughly) lunar months, Nuer society does not count or 
measure ‘Time as Such’; the language has no word either for the abstract no-
tion of time, or for units of abstract time, and temporal reference points are 
provided by social activities. “Nuer have no abstract numerical system of time-
reckoning based on astronomical observations but only descriptive divisions of 
cycles of human activities . . . since the months are anchored to oecological 
and social process the calendar is a conceptual schema which enables Nuer to 
view the year as an ordered succession of changes and to calculate to some 
extent the relation between one event and another in abstract numerical sym-
bols” (ibid.: 197, 200).
Nuer months are not strictly lunar (though the Nuer know the lunar cycle), 
nor based upon any other fixed number of days. Rather, they are convention-
ally, if indeterminately, based on both lunar and ecological cycles, and the as-
sociated rhythm of social activities.
Nuer would soon be in difficulty over their lunar calendar if they consistently counted 
the succession of moons, but there are certain activities associated with each month, the 
association sometimes being indicated by the name of the month. The calendar is a rela-
tion between a cycle of activities and a conceptual cycle, and the two cannot fall apart, 
since the conceptual cycle is dependent upon the cycle of activities from which it de-
rives its meaning and function. (Evans-Pritchard 1940: 100).
In summary, time for the Nuer is a schematized relation between socially and 
environmentally defined events, and Nuer time reckoning is not a calculation 
of, or in, ‘Time as Such’, but a rough estimate, only infrequently numerically 
expressed, based on social-structural relationships and activities. The Nuer 
seem, according to Levine’s (1997) terminology, to be living in “event time” 
rather than “clock time” — activities are not fitted into a schedule governed by 
the clock or calendar, rather the temporal structure of life emerges from par-
ticipation in daily activities.
Nuer time is not the only system of time intervals reported in the anthropo-
logical literature that employs lunar months in a non-quantified system. The 
time interval system of the Ainu culture of Southern Sakhalin, which in other 
respects (economy, social structure and cosmological time) is quite different 
from the Nuer system, includes lunar months which regulate ritual as well as 
trapping and fishing activity. However, “the Ainu are quite oblivious to names 
of the months as well as the number of months in the year” (Ohnuki-Tierney 
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1973: 289), and the Ainu, whose basic number system (non-derived numbers) 
extends to five, rarely or never reckon time intervals numerically, using the 
opposition between two or three and the derived number six to contrast short 
with long durations. While the Nuer event-based time interval system can be 
thought of as quasi-calendric, permitting rough time-reckoning practices, the 
unnamed Ainu lunar months do not participate in anything resembling a yearly 
calendar. Ohnuki-Tierney concludes that “the Ainu concept of time is basically 
qualitative; quantitative measurement of time is little developed. Therefore, no 
temporal divisions represent measurable units; they are distinguished from 
other units in the same time scale by the special meaning which the Ainu attach 
to them.” (ibid.: 292).
These descriptions of Nuer and Ainu event-based time interval systems 
serve as a useful starting point for our discussion of time in Amondawa. We 
start with a description of Amondawa time intervals based on ethnographic and 
field-experiment. We continue with a description of the lexicon and grammar 
of space and time.
5.	 Amondawa	culture	and	society:	an	overview
The Amondawa4 are an indigenous group living in the Uru-eu-wau-wau reser-
vation, in the State of Rondônia in Brazilian Greater Amazonia. Amondawa is 
classified as a Tupi Kawahib language belonging to the family Tupi-Guarani, 
closely related to the other Kawahib languages (Diahoi, Karipuna, Parintintin, 
Tenharim, Uru-eu-uau-uau) of Amazonian Brazil (Sampaio 1996, 1999; Sam-
paio and Silva 1998).
The population at the time of the field research here reported was about 115 
people. Before official contact in 1986 by the government agency FUNAI, the 
Amondawa population was almost 160 people; after contact, this number went 
down by more than 50%, according to contemporary reports. In 1991, the 
Amondawa population was no more than 45 people, living in the area sur-
rounding the Trincheira post, which is also the current habitation. The main 
cause for the precipitate decline of the population was contact-induced disease, 
such as tuberculosis, colds, measles, malarial fever, chicken pox and other vi-
ruses (Silva 1997).	At present, the population is skewed towards the younger 
generation which makes up more than a half of the population. Political orga-
nization is characterized by two forms of authority. The first is traditional, rep-
resented by the person of the Chief or Cacique, who is the descendent of past 
chiefs. The other form is representation by a younger man elected to be Presi-
4.  Amondawa is not the original pre-contact self-designation of this community, but is now the 
community usage.
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dent of the Indigenous Association by the whole community. The Presidency 
accords considerable power in political processes both inside and outside the 
community. All political issues are decided by the President of the Association 
after consultation with the Cacique and community. It is the responsibility of 
the President to represent the community and to deal with political and admin-
istrative relations with the Municipal Council, State and Federal Government 
Agencies. The Indigenous Association is a creation of the Federal Government 
intended to facilitate the direct allocation of resources to the community.
The Amondawa kinship system, in common with other Tupi Kawahib 
groups, is organized in terms of exogamous moieties. Descent is patrilineal. 
The woman does not lose her paternally derived name when she marries, but 
her children will be the descendent of her husband and adopt names from his 
moiety (Menendez 1989: 110). The Amondawa moieties are designated by the 
bird names Mutum and Arara5. The mutum is a black bird living almost all the 
time on the ground and the arara is a colourful macaw that lives in the highest 
trees. Descent is reflected in the system of personal proper names, because 
each moiety has an inventory of masculine and feminine names. Amondawa 
people change their names during their life course, and these names are indica-
tive of the person’s “age”/social role, gender, and moiety. The change of names 
occurs at the birth of a new baby and/or when the individual assumes a new 
position, attribute or role in social life. We describe this system and its signifi-
cance for the Amondawa cultural conceptualization of time below.
Amondawa productive activity is based around cultivation. The men work 
in the field planting corns, beans, rice, potatoes and manioc. Traditionally, cul-
tivation has been for subsistence but is now also for the market. Manioc flour 
is the most important commodity yielding monetary income for the commu-
nity. Each nuclear family has its own field. The families from the same moiety 
sometimes share work and profit. This means that in effect each moiety decides 
how much will be produced each season. There is no culture of accumulation 
or of keeping produce or seed for the next season; everything produced is con-
sumed or sold and the money is used for buying manufactured products, such 
as soap, clothes, shoes, TVs. Hunting and fishing, traditionally significant ac-
tivities, remain the other main sources of food.
The traditional mode of Amondawa education is oral and informal, but since 
1994 formal schooling has also been provided by the state. Today the majority 
of the Amondawa people are bilingual in Amondawa and Portuguese. Portu-
guese has high status because it is the main vehicle for communicating with 
others outside the village. Communication between community members is 
5.  The original indigenous name is Kanideia, but the term arara has become common usage 
post-contact.
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still in Amondawa, and Amondawa is the language of first acquisition. School-
ing is bilingual, with a predominance of spoken and written Amondawa as 
medium of instruction. The teacher (who acted as our principal language con-
sultant and a participant in the elicitation and experimental tasks described 
below) is a trained community member, supported by a specialist from the 
State Department of Education. The curriculum emphasizes Amondawa his-
tory and tradition and knowledge of the local environment.
6.	 Time	intervals	in	Amondawa	language	and	culture
Amondawa does not employ cardinal chronologies such as ages of individ-
uals, or ordinal chronologies such as yearly or monthly calendars, since the 
Amondawa number system has only four numeral terms, of which pe’i ‘one’ 
and monkõi ‘two’ can be considered basic. Monkõiape’i or ape’imonkõi are 
alternative lexicalizations of ‘three’; monkõiuturaipei and monkõimeme are al-
ternative lexicalizations of ‘four’.
An abstract term for time does not exist in Amondawa. The word kuara 
(‘sun’) is preferentially used to denote time intervals in general, since it is the 
movement of the sun which governs the passage of both the time of day and the 
seasons. Our ethnographic research has failed to identify any co-occurrence of 
numerals with any time interval designation. These features of the Amondawa 
language mean that Time Reckoning simply does not occur in Amondawa dis-
course. This does not, however, mean that the language lacks a lexicon of time 
intervals. The two time interval systems on which, together with the personal 
proper name system, we focus in this section are the seasonal and diurnal sys-
tems. As far as we know, these are the only such systems.
6.1. Method
A field manual was developed, which consisted of elicitation games and ques-
tionnaires (Zinken et al. 2005). The manual was specifically constructed to 
identify temporal expressions and their ranges of use in Amondawa. Two of the 
tasks in the field manual addressed the lexicalization of time interval terms — the 
calendar questionnaire and the calendar installation. These tasks are described 
below.
6.2. Task 1 calendar questionnaire
The aim of the calendar questionnaire was to provide data on the inventory of 
calendar event-types that are lexicalised in Amondawa. The questionnaire 
c onsists of a list of interval terms in Portuguese, relating to time intervals based 
on the moon (the month and its subdivisions), and on the sun (the day and 
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its subdivisions).6 It also contains questions about sowing, harvesting, and 
f estivals.
6.2.1. Participants. Data were collected during five field trips between 
September 2005 and January 2006. The participants were six adult bilingual 
native Amondawa language consultants (four male and two female), all of 
whom were familiar with the researchers administering the instruments and 
experienced in the role of language consultant. Only one of the participants had 
received formal schooling.
6.2.2. Procedure. The researcher started by asking direct questions in Por-
tuguese about Amondawa calendar units, names of festivals, parts of the day, 
and time adverbials as the central topic of the conversation. The researcher did 
not ask for literal translations, but asked more general questions about broadly 
equivalent terms in Amondawa and developed on this basis a conversation. It 
was emphasized to the participants that there were no right or wrong answers 
and that it was the Amondawa cultural knowledge that was the focus of inves-
tigation. All questions were posed in Portuguese, except for when the re-
searcher requested clarification of Amondawa terms and notions. The partici-
pants’ responses were video and audio recorded and post-transcribed.
6.2.3. Results. There is no word meaning time in Amondawa. There are in 
Amondawa no words for weeks, months and years, and there are no names for 
time-referenced festivals. In fact, there are no such festivals in contemporary 
Amondawa culture, only marriage parties and traditional ceremonies that are 
not calendrically organized.7 There are names for seasons and parts of the sea-
sons, for the day and night and parts of the day and night, and some temporal 
deictic and adverbial terms. These are listed in Table 1, which is not intended 
to be exhaustive.
6.3. Task 2 calendar installation: seasons
This elicitation game gave participants the opportunity to build a map of their 
model or schema of the seasons and their sub-intervals or constituents, by plac-
ing a series of paper plates, each representing a conventional time interval, on 
6.  The standard version of the Field Manual (Zinken et al. 2005) is written in English but was 
translated by the field researchers into Portuguese.
7.  We know little of the deep pre-contact history of Amazonian cultures, especially before the 
Spanish/Portuguese conquest. The only thing of which we can be certain is that it would be a 
grave mistake to view the existing (surviving) cultures of indigenous groups as being repre-
sentative of some “unchanging” primordial state “without history” (Hornborg and Hill In 
press; Wolf 1982).
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the ground. The participants were requested by the researcher to “make a map 
of the year using the objects.”
6.3.1. Procedure. Four participants (all men) were interviewed. The re-
searcher spoke in Portuguese with simultaneous translation into Amondawa. 
Paper plates were given to the participant, who was then asked to “make a map 
of time in Amondawa with them”, in which each plate should represent one 
interval of time in Amondawa culture. The example provided, to clarify the 
nature of the task for participants, was that in Portuguese each plate would 
represent a month. The participants’ responses were video and audio recorded 
and post-transcribed. Figure 1 shows the results of playing the game with one 
participant (whose responses were typical), who has used the plates to con-
struct a schematic representation of the succession of seasons in Amondawa.
6.3.2. Results. In Amondawa, there is no word for ‘year’. Linguistically, 
time is divided not into years, but into two seasons: the dry season Kuaripe ‘in 
the sun’ and the rainy season Amana ‘rain’. The term Kuaripe, referring to the 
hot, dry season, derives from the noun Kuara ‘sun’, with the locative postposi-
tion pe, ‘in’ or ‘at’ (see Section 8 below). The rainy season is designated simply 
by the noun Amana which means rain. The passage of the seasons is marked by 
changes in the weather, and consequent changes in the landscape, and also by 
the rhythm of agricultural activities. Each season is further subdivided into 
Table 1. Amondawa temporal reference terms
Nominals with temporal meaning English translation
Kuara Sun
Jahya Moon
Ipytuna Night, Black
Ko’ema Morning 
Ko’emameme “Tomorrow”
Other (adverbial) time referencing expressions
Koro, koroite Today, now, right now (fut)
Tiro Today, now, right now (fut)
Tirove Today, in the immediate past (earlier today)
Awo Here, now
Ki . . . ko Past 
Poti . . . nehe Future
Emo Past
Ramo Past
Ki . . . i’I Past
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three intervals corresponding to the beginning, middle (or “high”) and end 
parts of the season. Table 2 lists the Amondawa bi-seasonal lexical system.
Figure 2 represents, approximately, the way the seasons were mapped by 
participants. It is based upon the constructions of all four participants, each of 
whom constructed a curvilinear representation which fitted into the available 
working space, more or less on the lateral axis perpendicular to the direction in 
which the participant faced, in either a left-to-right or right-to-left order of 
placement. No participants attempted to create a circular, cyclic representation. 
It is unclear whether the curvilinear responses were a result of a compromise 
between an intended rectilinear configuration and the length of human reach, 
or signify that neither cyclicity nor rectilinearity are relevant to the Amondawa 
seasonal schema.
6.4. Task 3 calendar installation: days
This elicitation game gave participants the opportunity to build a map and/or 
installation of their model or schema of the diurnal cycle. The procedure was 
identical to that described above for the calendar installation. The day installa-
tion game was administered immediately after the calendar installation game.
Figure 1. One participant’s representation of the Amondawa year.
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6.4.1. Results. The term for ‘day’ in Amondawa, Ara, refers only to the 
daylight hours and also has the meaning ‘sunlight’. There is no Amondawa 
term for the entire 24-hour diurnal cycle. Ara, ‘day’, contrasts with Iputuna-
him, ‘night’, which also means ‘intense black’. There is a major subdivision of 
Ara, ‘day’, into two parts, Ko´ema ‘morning’, and Karoete ‘noon/afternoon’. 
Thus, additionally to the binary day-night contrast, it is also possible to say that 
the 24-hour period is divided into three major parts, Ko´ema, Karoete and Ipu-
tunahim. Both day and night are further subdivided into intervals which are 
conceptualized and named on the basis of the daily round of activities. Table 3 
lists all time interval terms produced by the participants in the day installation 
game.
The schematization of the diurnal cycle does not seem to be cyclical or cir-
cular. In trying to explain this task, the researchers used a circular diagram re-
sembling a clock, with light and dark areas. However, none of the participants 
Table 2. Amondawa seasonal time interval words
AMONDAWA ENGLISH
Kuaripe Time	of	the	sun	(“SUMMER”)	
O´an kuara “The sun is born”. The arrival of the sun ( beginning of the time of the 
sun).
Itywyrahim kuara “Burning sun”. Very strong, hot sun, high summer. 
Kuara Tuin
Or
Akyririn Amana
“Small sun”. End of the time of the sun.
“Almost rain”. The time of falling rain is close.
Amana Rain	/	Time	of	the	rain	(“WINTER”)	
Akyn Amana “Falling rain”. The arrival of the rain. 
Akyrimba´U Amana
Or
Amana Ehãi
“Heavy falling rain”. Time of the heavy rains.
“Great rain”. Rain of long extent and duration. 
Amana Tuin
Or
Akyririn Kuara
“Small rain”. End of the rainy season.
“Almost sun”. The time of the sun is close.
Figure 2. The Amondawa Season Schema.
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produced a circular installation. Instead, they produced curvilinear representa-
tions similar to those produced in the calendar installation game.
7.	 Time	and	the	human	lifespan	in	Amondawa
As we noted above, the age of an individual is not measured chronologically in 
Amondawa culture, which lacks a numerical system able to enumerate above 
four. Rather, individuals are categorized in terms of stages or periods of the 
lifespan, based upon social status and role, and position in family birth order. 
As we have also noted, each Amondawa individual changes their name during 
the course of their life, and the rules governing these name changes form a 
strict onomastic system. The Amondawa onomastic system is based upon the 
cross-cutting category systems of life stage, gender and moiety. It is obligatory 
for each individual to change his or her name when changing from one life 
stage to another, and each name is selected from a finite inventory of names, 
each of which has a semantic value indicating moiety, gender and life stage. 
Thus, by knowing the name of an Amondawa person, one can infer these di-
mensions of their social status.
The principal event which can cause a change of names is the birth of a new 
member of the family. The new baby will be given a ‘Newborn’ name, and may 
Table 3. Parts of the day in Amondawa
Ara or ajia Day	(daylight)
ko´ ema Morning 
Pojiwete “When we start work”. Early morning.
Kojawahim “When we feel hungry”. 
A´U Matera “When we eat”. Lunchtime.
Ajia Katua
Ajimbu´ U
“Good morning time”. After lunch.
“Heavy morning” Late morning. 
Pyriete Kuara Ruwi
Ajia katua
“The sun is high” High noon. 
Karoete Noon;	afternoon.
Pyryrym Kuara “The sun is turning”. Early afternoon.
Momina Werin Kuara “The sun is almost gone”. Late afternoon, dusk.
Momina Kuara “The sun is gone”. Early evening. Twilight.
Iputuna Night	( black)
Opon Jahya Tiro “The moon leaps up now”. Moonrise. 
Apehyiahim “No more work.intense”. Sleep time.
Apoji Katua
Ypytunahim
“Good . . . .”
“Intense darkness” Middle of the night.
Pyriete Jahya Ruwi “The moon is high in the sky”. 
Jahya Pyryrym “The moon is turning”. Dawn is coming.
Ko´ Ema Werin “Almost morning”. Dawn. 
Opon Kuara Tiro “The sun jumps up now”. Sunrise.
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even assume a name previously held by the youngest existing family member; 
who then takes a new name. Regardless of the name given to the newborn, all 
the existing children will acquire a new name. The other situation that can 
provoke the changing of names is a change in the role of the individual in the 
family or in the group. No individual can be a child forever, in other words no-
one can have a child name beyond a certain life stage. They have to grow up 
and assume responsibilities in the family. For example, when an older son 
changes his name, the father will change his name too. An adult woman will 
change her name when she is married, and her previous name will go to the 
youngest sister (Peggion 2005: 132). The names do not appear to have spiritual 
significance, and in assuming a new name and new social identity, the indi-
vidual does not become identified with the personality of previous living or 
dead bearers of the name. Table 4 gives examples of names in each Amondawa 
moiety with an indication of their status meanings, although it is important to 
note that this is only an approximation. Table 4 does not represent the entire 
name inventory.
The Amondawa language also has at least the following generic nouns refer-
ring to categories of persons of a particular age (Table 5):
Our own and others’ research (Sampaio 1996; Silva 2000; Peggion 2005) has 
not been able to identify any other age-based person categories such as ‘ado-
lescent’. Although we are not fully certain of this, our research to date suggests 
that there is only one more general expression, namely etiawa’ea (‘old’, an 
Table 4. Amondawa names and life stages
Arara (F) Arara (M) Mutun (F) Mutun (M) Life stage
Tape Awip Morãg Mbitete Newborn to toddler
Potei Tangãe Pote´ i Kuembu Child to pre-adolescent
Poti´ I Pure-Tebu Mbore´ i Koari Adolescent (from puberty)
Kunhate Juvipa Mboraop Tarup Young adult
Mande´ I
Adiju
Umby
Purap
Mboria
Mboria
Mboropo
Kunha´ pó
kunhaviju
Yvaka
Moarimã
Mboava
Adult
Mytãg Jari Mbore´ a Uyra Elder
Table 5. Generic nouns referring to categories of persons
Kurumin Baby/child
Kwambáea
Kuñã
Man
Woman
Amu
Tiwi
Old man
Old woman
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adjective of quality or state applicable to any object) used for reference to life 
stage:
(14) Aron jie etiawa’ea.
 Waiting I old (ADJ)
 ‘I am waiting for my old age.’
In other cases, life stage is referred to by means of the relevant life stage cate-
gory, e.g.
(15) a-kuahaw-a-him jie kurumin ga inguarai-awer-a.
 1SG-imagine-GER-INTENS I child he play-PAST-NOM
 ‘Imagining I played as a child.’
In summary, the temporal intervals making up human life stages in the 
Amondawa culture and language are designated in the kinship-related onomas-
tic conceptual system, and to a more limited extent in categories of person of a 
particular age. They are not related to any calendric or numeric system seg-
menting ‘Time as Such’, and they are not constituents of either exact or rough 
quantitative time reckoning.
8.	 Do	Amondawa	speakers	use	space-time	constructional	mapping?
Amondawa possesses a diverse lexical and constructional repertoire for the 
conceptualization and expression of location and spatial motion. Here we give 
only a brief summary. A more extensive comparative and typological analysis, 
including examples of usage, can be found in Sampaio, Sinha and Silva Sinha 
(2009). Amondawa largely (though not wholly) conforms to the verb-framed 
paradigm (Talmy 1983, 1985, 1991) for expressing motion events, employ-
ing path conflating motion verbs, postpositions and adverbs. Motion verbs in-
clude the following ( NB: the verb stem is obligatorily prefixed for person and 
number):
-ho ‘go’, ‘exit’ ( basic motion verb)
-hem ‘exit’
-xi ‘enter’
-jupin ‘ascend’, ‘climb’
-jym ‘descend’
Postpositions, which are obligatory when specifying path of motion in relation 
to a Ground, include:
pe ‘at’, ‘to’, ‘in’
pupe / pype ‘in’, ‘inside’, ‘into’, ‘to the inside’
wi ‘from’, ‘out of’
re ‘up’, ‘up in’, ‘up on’, ‘up into’, ‘up onto’
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katy ‘nearby’ (stative)
aramo ‘over’, ‘above’
urumõ / urymõ ‘under’, ‘below’, ‘beneath’
pywõ ‘by’, ‘past’ ( path, dynamic)
rupi ‘along’ (a path)
Optional directional and deictic adverbs, which can be considered as quasi-
verbs, and whose meanings are highly context-dependent, include:
ura ‘inside’ (the Ground)
hua ‘coming’ (towards speaker)
awowo ‘going’ (away from speaker)
This brief and non-exhaustive description clearly demonstrates that Amondawa 
possesses a diverse inventory of lexical resources in the domain of space and 
spatial motion, potentially available for recruitment in space-time linguistic 
mapping. Constructional resources, as would be expected, are no less richly 
available; we refer the reader to Sampaio et al. (2009) for a full account. In the 
rest of this section, we describe the way in which time relations are expressed 
in Amondawa. Note that we focus here on the constructional expression of 
relational temporal notions, in which an event is situated in relation to an im-
plicit or explicit temporal reference point. We have not systematically investi-
gated the extent to which Amondawa exemplifies simpler lexical space-time 
mappings in, for example, duration terms (e.g. Eng. long).
The linguistic conceptualization and expression of time relations in the Tupi 
languages of Brazil has been little researched and analyzed, even though de-
scriptive grammars of Tupi languages have a long history. Father José de An-
chieta, in his grammar of Old Tupi published in 1595 (A arte de grammatica 
da lingua mais usada na costa do Brasil ), noted that past and future were not 
expressed in verbal tense-marking morphology, but by morphological modifi-
cation of nouns (Leite 2000). Amondawa has a just such a nominal suffix sys-
tem, in which the termination of relations to things or states in the past, or the 
expectation of them in the future, is marked on the noun (analogously to 
e xpressions in English such as ‘ex-husband’ or ‘husband-to-be’). Muysken 
(2008) discusses the prevalence in Tupi-Guarani languages, and in other lan-
guage families including seven other Amazonian families, of what he desig-
nates (following Nordlinger and Sadler 2004) as Nominal Tense-Aspect-Mood 
( Nominal TAM) — though we would suggest a better designation, at least for 
Tupi-Guarani, is nominal aspect.8 Muysken (2008) suggests that nominal TAM 
8.  Muyskens (2008) cites Tonhauser (2007), who criticizes the use by Nordlinger and Sadler 
(2004) of the term ‘tense’ to denote such temporal relational nominal inflection systems, and 
with whom we concur. Not all Tupi-Guarani languages mark aspect on the noun: some have a 
more familiar verbal aspect system (see e.g. Gonzáles 2005).
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is an Amazonian areal feature (though the phenomenon occurs in some North 
American, African and Australian languages too). We have not yet analyzed 
nominal aspect in Amondawa in detail, and we shall not discuss it further here, 
except to note that these markers are not derived from any of the locative or 
motion items listed above, or any others that we have noted. The semantics and 
pragmatics of nominal aspect in Amondawa and other Tupi-Guarani languages 
is clearly an important topic for future research.
Amondawa, in the absence of verbal tense, does not oblige speakers to spec-
ify event time, and in many or most cases temporal reference is interpreted 
(similarly to other Tupi-Guarani languages, see Gonzáles 2005: 154) accord-
ing to context. However, when required, the time of an event in the past or 
f uture is marked by temporal deictic adverbial particles and dependent mor-
phemes. Future is expressed by -nehe, poti, poti . . . nehe. Past is expressed by 
ki . . . ko, ki . . . i´i, emo, ramo. Present or immediate future (‘now’, ‘right 
now’) by tiro, koro. These items do not closely specify a reference time, but 
involve varying degrees of intensification of temporal distance (in the past or 
future) or of immediacy in relation to the time of utterance.
(16) T-aho koro ´i ga nehe.
 REL-3SG.go now.INTENS he FUT
 ‘He will go out (from here) just now.’
 (Proximal Future)
(17) Kuaripe taian ´i ga nehe.
 dry season arrive.INTENS he FUT
 ‘He will arrive in the summer (dry season).’
 (Distal Future; spoken during rainy season)
(18) Da-o-ur-i ki ga ko.
 NEG-3SG-come-NEG PAST he PAST
 ‘He did not come.’
 (Past)
There is at least one time interval word that can be used to designate a temporal 
reference point. The meaning of the word ko’emame approximates to ‘tomor-
row’ or ‘the morning of the next day’. This compound word derives from 
a pplying a temporal suffix –me (‘when’) to the noun ko’ema ‘morning’ (see 
Section 6 above). Note that this suffix is not derived from any of the locative 
terms listed above, and has no locative meaning. It should also be noted that 
ko’emame does not distinguish between ‘tomorrow’ and (for example) ‘the day 
after tomorrow’.
We do not claim that the data we present above, which were taken from 
questionnaire and elicited narrative data, are exhaustive of temporal terms, or 
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terms that can be used temporally. Furthermore, we suspect that some of the 
terms we list above are polysemous; they may (or may not) also express other 
notions. Nevertheless, we feel reasonably confident in making two assertions. 
First, Amondawa speakers are able to (and regularly do) talk about events in 
the past and future, and to temporally relate events to each other. Second, such 
temporal expressions appear not to be derived from the Amondawa lexical and 
constructional inventory for expressing spatial location and motion.
Of course, relying on limited spontaneous and elicited speech data may lead 
to the researcher missing evidence for space-to-time mapping, and we also 
used questionnaire items from our Field Manual (Zinken et al. 2005) to ask 
bilingual Amondawa speakers to provide literal translations of Portuguese ex-
pressions such as:
(19) O ano que vêm.
 The year that comes
 ‘The coming year.’
In all cases the speakers rejected the possibility of using Amondawa motion 
verbs in Ego-relative temporal motion constructions. Furthermore, when we 
asked Amondawa speakers to narrate the well-known ‘Frog Story’ (Mayer 
1969; Berman and Slobin 1994), there was no evidence of the use of locative 
terms to specify Positional Time, nor of any Positional temporal adverbs cor-
responding to English ‘before’ and ‘after’.9
However, one further task that we administered did yield the use by (in each 
case below) at least one native Amondawa speaker of a motion verb (some-
times with a locative postposition or adverb) to express motion relations be-
tween time intervals.
8.1. Task 4 time landscape game
The task involved the manipulation by the experimenter of paper capsules (or 
figures) that were designated and named by the experimenter as time intervals, 
with the experimenter using the elicited Amondawa terms reported in Section 6.
8.1.1. Procedure. The experimenter placed one or two figures in line per-
pendicular to the gaze of the consultant, in some cases with a small doll repre-
senting an observer situated on the same imaginary line of movement. The 
9.  Such temporal connectives are also absent in at least one other unrelated language, Yucatec 
Maya (Bohnemeyer 2010), and probably others. Yucatec Maya does, however, employ spatial 
relational nouns equivalent to ‘front’ and ‘back’ to express temporal order in what seem to be 
Positional Time constructions equivalent to Example (4). Bohnemeyer does not report whether 
Ego-relative temporal motion constructions are used in Yucatec Maya.
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experimenter then laterally moved one of the figures along the imaginary line 
so that it reversed its relative position in relation to the other figure / ego doll. 
The consultant was simply asked (in Portuguese) to describe in Amondawa 
what they had seen.
8.1.2. Results. The following are examples of descriptions produced by the 
Amondawa consultants:
(20) O-ho kuara tiro.
 3SG-go sun now
 ‘The sun/dry season goes.’
(21) Akuam kuara.
 cross sun
	 ‘The sun/dry season has passed across.’
(22) Uhum kuara.
 Coming sun
 ‘The sun/dry season is coming.’
(23) Amana a-ko kuara renande.
 Rain be-moving sun in front of
 ‘The rainy season is moving in front of the dry season.’
(24) Kuara o’an amana renande.
 sun born rain in front of
 ‘The dry season [is] born in front of the rainy season.’
(25) Iputuna´iwa owun ewire.
 night/dark coming up behind
 ‘The night is coming behind [the sun].’
It should be noted that all of the above utterances were elicited in situations 
involving spatial motion. It would thus be an unwarranted over-interpretation 
to claim that the utterances instantiate space-time linguistic mapping. The elic-
ited utterances do, however, clearly demonstrate that there are no lexical re-
striction rules or other intra-linguistic constraints in Amondawa that preclude 
the use of words with motion and location meanings for expressing motion 
events and Figure-Ground relations involving time interval nouns. F urthermore, 
we have evidence that the apparent absence of conventionalized space-time 
linguistic mapping in Amondawa is not due to Amondawa speakers being de-
terminedly “literal”, or reluctant to analogically extend the meanings of motion 
verbs, since they also readily give Amondawa examples of “fictive motion” 
constructions (Talmy 1999).
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9.	 Discussion
Amondawa, we have established, has both a time interval lexicon and an ex-
tensive lexico-grammatical inventory for spatial motion and spatial relations. 
This inventory can, under suitable (if artificially induced) conditions be em-
ployed by speakers in constructions of the kind that we see in (20) to (25) 
above, which have the form of Ego-relative temporal motion and Positional 
time constructions, even though they cannot be said to exemplify linguistic 
space-time mapping. Why then does Amondawa not regularly employ such 
constructions to conceptualize and express temporal relationships between 
events, intervals and ego? Why, in short, does Amondawa provide negative 
evidence for the Universal Mapping H ypothesis?
We would strongly disavow any interpretation of the data that we pre-
sent that would exoticize the Amondawa by suggesting that they are a 
‘P eople without Time’. The Amondawa, like all human groups, are able to 
linguistically conceptualize inter-event relationships which are, by defini-
tion, temporal. The Amondawa language exhibits a nominal aspect system. 
Speakers lexicalize past and future in temporal deixis. They have cultural 
n arratives of the collective past and mythic narratives, and the lexicon of 
k inship, social status and personal identity is based on life span devel-
opmental time. The Amondawa are not a People without Time, and if we 
wish to account for the seeming absence in the language of conventional-
ized space-time analogical mappings, this cannot be sought in a generalized 
absence of reference to, or thinking about, temporally structured events and 
relations.
Nor do Amondawa speakers appear to adhere to a principle or “postulate of 
the cultural value of immediate experience that constrains grammar and living 
. . . [yielding] an inability in principle to talk about things removed from per-
sonal experience” such as that proposed by Everett (2005: 633) for the geneti-
cally and typologically unrelated Amazonian language Pirahã. Everett (2005: 
631) specifically proposes that the absence in Pirahã of reference-time (as op-
posed to utterance-time) based time/tense, as well as “the lack of concern for 
quantifying time in Pirahã culture” is a consequence of the principle of im-
mediacy of experience. Whatever may be the case for Pirahã, the Amondawa 
have narratives which both relate them to other groups and lend their own 
community a history and an identity. These narratives link the present day 
Amondawa to a time before contact, and in turn to the narratives that were told 
in those times. Amondawa grammar and Amondawa speech practices for talk-
ing about temporally situated and related events cannot, therefore, be derived 
from the principle of immediacy of experience. We do not have space to dis-
cuss Everett’s proposals in detail here, except to suggest that possible areal 
commonalities in the linguistic conceptualization of time in Amazonian lan-
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guages, and cultural motivations for these, is a topic that urgently requires 
further investigation.10
Although Everett’s principle of the immediacy of experience cannot account 
for our data on Amondawa, we do agree with his more general thesis of the 
socio-cultural motivation of linguistic facts and language practices. Our data 
point unambiguously to the conclusion that Amondawa speakers (at least when 
“thinking for speaking” in Amondawa, see Slobin 1996) do not conceptualize 
events as occurring in ‘Time as Such’, and do not employ linguistic space-time 
mapping constructions; it is this that we seek to explain.
The Amondawa seasonal and diurnal time interval systems exemplify an 
event-based schematization of time intervals. Event-based time intervals are 
those whose boundaries are constituted by the event itself. In this sense, there 
is no cognitive differentiation between the time interval and the duration of the 
event or activity which defines it, and from which in general the lexicalization 
of the time interval derives.11 We have found that:
–  Amondawa time interval conceptualization is not integrated or coordinated 
with the four-number Amondawa numeral system. This fact precludes nu-
meric time reckoning as a cognitive and linguistic practice.
–  Time intervals are not used as reference-time markers in relation to which 
other events are related using postpositions, analogously with English ex-
pressions such as (7) above.
–  The rhythms of the natural world dominate the seasonal and diurnal time 
interval systems. The prominence of the sun, in terms of the intensity of 
emitted heat and light in different seasons, and its position in the sky at dif-
ferent times of day, is reflected in language consultants’ choice of the lex-
eme kuara ‘sun/sunlight’ as the nearest Amondawa equivalent term for the 
Portuguese word tempo, ‘time’, for which no strict translation equivalent 
exists.
–  Both the seasonal and the diurnal time interval systems involve division 
and subdivision. The superordinate level of the seasonal system is bi- partite 
(dry season-rainy season), while that of the diurnal system seems to have 
two alternative divisional structures, a primary bi-partite one (day-night) 
and a secondary tri-partite one (morning-afternoon-night). Beneath these 
superordinate divisions are lower level subdivisions.
10.  See the response to Everett by Gonçalves 2005; and a posting made by two of the present 
authors to The Linguist List (Silva Sinha and Sinha 2007).
11.  The event-based time interval may be characterized as a change of state (e.g. ‘sunrise’), as a 
stative event attribute (e.g. Amondawa ara, ‘daylight’), or as an activity. The lexicalization 
may be metonymic or “pars pro toto”, as in Amondawa pojiwete, ‘when we start work, morn-
ing’ (Whitrow 1988: 15).
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–  In both cases it is the ‘subdivision’ level of organization that is coordinated 
with the organization of social and, in particular, labour activity, regulating 
planting and harvesting times and working times during the day.
The seasonal and diurnal time interval systems can therefore properly be 
thought of as cognitive, cultural and linguistic schemas, but they differ from 
more familiar calendric and clock schemas in that there is no evidence that they 
are conceptualized by speakers as being cyclical in structure. Cyclicity is sche-
matically characterized in terms of a circular or orbital path of motion in which 
“Moving Time” returns recurrently to the positions which demarcate the time 
intervals. None of our language consultants either verbally described a tem-
poral cycle or produced a physical schematic model (installation) that pos-
sessed a circular structure. Rather, the schematization seems to be simply in 
terms of succession, which may be (as we have seen) spatially modelled as a 
line, though not necessarily a straight one. Amondawa seasonal and diurnal 
time intervals are thus best thought of as high-level event categories —  
‘happenings’, as it were, in the natural and social world, with which other hap-
penings may coincide, or to which other activities and events are indexed.
The third time interval system that we have analyzed above is the conceptual 
system of Amondawa life stages, as this is reflected in Amondawa onomastic 
practices and knowledge. Time intervals in this system are conceptually in-
separable from the Amondawa kinship and descent system, and form the basis 
of the social identity of individuals within that system. The names themselves 
have at least in some cases a meaning derived from gender and social roles, eg 
Kunha´pó ‘doing as a woman’ derives from Kunha (‘woman’) and po (‘make/
do/work’).
The time intervals that co-constitute (with gender and moiety) the onomastic 
system are not linguistically independent concepts, that is, they are not (or not 
all) designated by nominals (although there are nouns for child, adult and 
e lder). Hence, we cannot say of these time interval concepts that they are high 
level events in the same way as are the seasonal and diurnal time intervals. In 
fact, from a linguistic point of view they are implicit or covert categories which 
are, in at least some cases, lexicalized only in conflation with other (gender and 
moiety) categories, and then only as personal proper names. Life-stage time 
intervals are thus even further removed from the conventional Western concep-
tion of a time interval than the event-based seasonal and diurnal time intervals. 
Kinship as a basis for temporal reference, is however, widespread; historical 
time for the Nuer is largely defined in terms of the initiation-based “age-set 
system”, and is therefore conceptualized in terms of “the movement of per-
sons, often as groups, through the social structure” (Whitrow 1988: 10).
Amondawa time bears other similarities to Nuer time as described by Evans-
Pritchard. The social and linguistic construction of time is based upon the in-
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terplay between ecological facts in the natural environment, and social facts or 
structures. The basis for social structure time in Amondawa, as in Nuer culture, 
is twofold. The rhythm of activity, especially work, and the stages of life con-
structed in social affiliation, although, whereas for the Nuer this is based upon 
initiation cohort groups, for the Amondawa it is based upon individual transi-
tions through a kin-defined onomastic system. In the terms that we have em-
ployed above, for both Amondawa and Nuer, time intervals are event-based 
and social, rather than time-based.
There are also two notable differences between Nuer and Amondawa time 
intervals. First, the Nuer employ a ‘quasi-calendar’ of 12 months. Second, the 
Nuer months can be enumerated, although “Nuer do not reckon [months] as 
fractions of a [year] unit. They may be able to state in what month an event 
occurred, but it is with great difficulty that they reckon the relation between 
events in abstract numerical symbols.” (Evans-Pritchard 1940: 104).
Amondawa time intervals do not include months, and time reckoning is ap-
parently entirely absent from the repertoire of cultural practices. We might 
hypothesize, then, that while both Amondawa and Nuer time interval systems 
are event-based, the Nuer system possesses more features potentiating an evo-
lution to a time-based system. Amongst the symbolic resources necessary for 
the cultural emergence of time-based time interval systems, such as true calen-
dric and clock systems, is the existence of a more elaborate number system 
than the restricted Amondawa quantificational system. However, comparison 
with the Nuer case suggests that while necessary, this, in itself, is not sufficient.
What implications does this analysis hold for understanding time as a con-
ceptual domain, and its relationship with space? We advance three linked hy-
potheses. First, time-based time interval systems and categories are in a funda-
mental way linguistically constructed, that is, they cannot be “thought” without 
thinking them through language and for speaking (Slobin 1996). The concep-
tual schematization of time-based time interval systems is not based in pre-
linguistic and pre-conceptual image schemas (Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and John-
son 1999). Rather, conceptual schemas such as the calendar are constituted 
by the use of linguistically organized, materially-anchored symbolic cognitive 
artefacts.
Second, the conceptual domain of ‘Time as Such’ is not a human cognitive 
universal, but a cultural and historical construction, constituted by schematized 
time-based time interval systems, reflection upon which is language and cul-
ture dependent.
Third, because the cognitive domain of ‘Time as Such’ is a cultural, h istorical 
and linguistic construction, the hypothesis that it is universally constructed by 
metaphoric mapping from the conceptual domain of space is false. Rather, 
even if it is the case that space-time mappings are motivated by compelling 
inter-domain analogic correlation, and perhaps facilitated by neural structure, 
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it is the cultural, historical and linguistic construction of the domain of ‘Time 
as Such’ that potentiates the linguistically widespread ( but not universal) re-
cruitment of spatial language for expressing temporal relations in space-time 
mapping constructions.
At this point, a brief excursion into the vexed issue of the Whorfian analysis 
of Hopi time, and more generally Whorf’s formulation of the linguistic relativ-
ity hypothesis, becomes unavoidable. Whether or not Whorf’s own linguistic 
analysis of conceptualization and expression of time in the North American 
indigenous language Hopi was adequate and comprehensive (Malotki 1983), 
Whorf noted (in one of his unpublished and unfinished articles, see Whorf 
1950: 27) a cultural-cognitive phenomenon in Hopi that bears directly on the 
topic of this article. The Hopi speaker, he said, “has no general notion or intu-
ition of time as a smooth flowing continuum in which everything in the uni-
verse proceeds at an equal rate, out of a future, through a present, into a past; 
or, in which, to reverse the picture, the observer is being carried in the stream 
of duration continuously away from a past and into a future.” In other words, 
he claimed that Moving Ego and Moving Time construals were absent in Hopi, 
just as we claim that they (and Positional time construals) are also absent in 
Amondawa. Recent experimental demonstrations of Whorfian or Whorf-like 
effects in linguistic space-time mapping (e.g. Boroditsky 2001; Casasanto 
2008, 2010) make the tacit assumption, on the contrary, that linguistic space-
time mappings are universal, differing between languages only in their orienta-
tion and directionality.
It is also worth noting that the recent Whorfian research on space-time map-
ping also demonstrates the powerful influence of experimentally induced 
c ontextual variation on response patterns — what we might profitably call 
V ygotsky-Luria effects (e.g. Vygotsky 1978). Seen from this perspective, 
Whorfian effects are best understood as linguistically entrenched Vygotsky-
Luria effects based in semiotic mediation; and they exemplify an influence of 
linguistic structure and habitual linguistic practice upon non-linguistic cogni-
tive processes. Such effects of language on thought (as Casasanto 2010 points 
out) in no way imply an absence of universal cognitive capacities. In fact, our 
data clearly demonstrate that even when entrenched, habitual, regular l inguistic 
space-time mapping is absent, the cognitive capacity for construing temporal 
concepts in terms of spatial arrays is present in Amondawa speakers; indeed 
the tasks that we administered depend upon the language informants’ capaci-
ties to make such construals. Our hypothesis, quite explicitly, does not propose 
any generalized absence of the capacity for cognitive space-time mapping on 
the part of speakers of Amondawa (or any other human group).
In short, our hypothesis is that the cognitive and linguistic domain of ‘Time 
as Such’ is not a cognitive universal, but a historical construction based in so-
cial practice, semiotically mediated by symbolic and cultural-cognitive arte-
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facts for time based time interval reckoning, and subsequently entrenched in 
lexico-grammar. Linguistic space-time mapping, and the recruitment of spatial 
language for structuring temporal relations, is consequent on the cultural con-
struction of this cognitive and linguistic domain. This hypothesis, if true, has 
more general implications. In particular, we need to re-examine the notion of 
cultural evolution and its place in language and cognitive variation. This does 
not imply postulating universal, pre-determined evolutionary pathways. 
Rather, we need to situate language and cognition in the social ecology of what 
Bourdieu (1977: 86) called habitus: “a subjective but not individual system of 
internalized structures, schemes of perception, conception and action common 
to all members of the same group.”
10.	 Conclusion
We challenge, on the basis of research on the Amondawa language and culture, 
the widespread assumption that linguistic constructional space-time mapping 
is universal (the Universal Mapping Hypothesis). We propose an alternative 
account that can be formulated as the Mediated Mapping Hypothesis (MMH), 
consisting of the following sub-hypotheses:
a)  The widespread linguistic mapping (lexical and constructional) between 
space and time, which is often claimed to be universal, is better under-
stood as a ‘quasi-universal’, conditional (at least at the constructional 
level), not absolute.12
b)  Though not absolutely universal, linguistic space-time mapping is sup-
ported by universal properties of the human cognitive system, which (to-
gether with experiential correlations between spatial motion and temporal 
duration) motivate linguistic space-time mapping.
c)  The constructional elaboration of this mapping is mediated by number 
concepts and number notation systems, the deployment of which in sym-
bolic cognitive artefacts such as calendar systems transforms the concep-
tual representation of time from event-based to time-based time interval 
systems; yielding the culturally constructed concept of ‘Time as Such’.
d)  Whether or not the concept of ‘Time as Such’ is lexicalized, the framing 
and schematization of events as occurring in ‘Time as Such’ is a precondi-
tion for (or corollary of  ) the cultural development of linguistic (meta-
phoric) space-time mapping constructions. It may be that such framing is 
also a precondition for the emergence of event time-referenced (as o pposed 
to utterance time-referenced) tense systems, but this latter sub-hypothesis 
requires extensive further investigation.
12.  A conditional universal is implicational in the sense that if A is conditional upon B, the exist-
ence of A implies the existence of B.
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The above account, we stress, is hypothetical, derived from the linguistic case 
study evidence that we present in this article. While it is consistent both with 
our own and others’ evidence it stands in need of extensive testing based upon 
a larger database of detailed research both in Amondawa and in other related 
and unrelated languages.
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